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SUMMARY
Intermediaries are seen as important actors in
facilitating payments for environmental services
(PES). However, few data exist on the adequacy
of the services provided by intermediaries and the
impacts of their interventions. Using four PES case
studies in Vietnam, this paper analyses the roles of
government agencies, non-government organizations,
international agencies, local organizations and
professional consulting firms as PES intermediaries.
The findings indicate that these intermediaries are
essential in supporting PES establishment. Their roles
are as service and information providers, mediators,
arbitrators, equalizers, representatives, watchdogs,
developers of standards and bridge builders. Concerns
have been raised about the quality of intermediaries’
participatory work, political influence on intermediar-
ies’ activities and the neutral status of intermediaries.
Although local organizations are strongly driven by
the government, they are important channels for the
poor to express their opinions. However, to act as
environmental services (ES) sellers, local organizations
need to overcome numerous challenges, particularly
related to capacity formonitoring ES and enforcement
of contracts. Relationships amongst intermediaries
are complex and should be carefully examined by
PES stakeholders to avoid negative impact on the
poor. Each of the intermediaries may operate at a
different level and can have different functions but a
multi-sector approach is required for an effective PES
implementation.
Keywords: environmental services, intermediaries, local
organizations, payment for environmental services, pro-poor,
Vietnam
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INTRODUCTION
Payment for environmental services (PES) is a specific
approach to enhance provision of environmental services (ES)
and rural livelihoods through performance-based contracts
(Pham et al. 2008). PES is not usually explicity designed as
a poverty reduction tool but it is expected to have positive
impacts on the rural poor, both as beneficiaries of PES schemes
and through conservation of the natural ecosystems upon
which they rely for their livelihood (Leimona & Lee 2008).
Therefore, environmental protection incentives, including
PES, often are in line with national poverty alleviation
policies. In many developing countries, PES is usually poorly
understood amongst ES buyers, sellers, decision makers and
the public. Each of these actors has different interests in
what they can gain from PES, some of which are competing.
The conflicting interests of stakeholders who nevertheless
have to work together (Moss 2009) have created a role for
‘honest brokers’ who can stimulate and facilitate PES (Wertz-
Kanounnikoff & Kongphan-Apirak 2008).
Such intermediaries can be individuals, organizations or a
network that connect different stakeholders together (Medd&
Marvin 2007; Mike & Simon 2008). They carry out different
tasks depending on their abilities, mandates and the local
context (van Noordwijk et al. 2007; Mike & Simon 2008;
Moss et al. 2009). They also transfer knowledge and resources
between groups, increase market competition and exert
political influence (Khurana 2002). This provides both ES
sellers and buyers with filtered and interpreted information,
reduces their exposure to risks and transaction costs, and helps
local institutions develop (Lee & Mahanty 2007; Leimona &
Lee 2008; Locatelli et al. 2008).
Although intermediaries have been discussed in the context
of PES, few data exist on the adequacy of the services they
provide and the costs of their intervention (Bracer et al.
2007; Moss et al. 2009). Most literature on intermediaries
is theoretical and lacks empirical evidence (van der Meulen
et al. 2005). While much attention is given to the positive
impact of intermediaries in PES, their possible negative
impacts (for example destruction of local culture and customs)
are often overlooked (Campbell & Shackleton 2001; Pollard &
Court 2005; Mike & Simon 2008). The few existing studies
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nevertheless illustrate the complexity of the involvement of
intermediaries, as their participation can have both positive
and negative impacts on local people.
PES conditionality, namely that payments are only made
if services are delivered, requires transparent information
and equal power in negotiation amongst stakeholders to
ensure fairness and effectiveness (Ferraro 2008). However,
the poor often have limited influence on decision making
(Hovland 2003) and limited knowledge about PES (Huang
& Upadhyaya 2007). There is a high risk that other actors
with more information can exploit the poor. For PES to be
pro-poor, intermediaries (such as local farmers’ organizations)
might address this asymmetrical information access and
ensure benefits reach the poor inPES (Arifin 2005;Zhang et al.
2008).
This paper examines the importance of intermediaries as
PES facilitators in Vietnam. Using four PES case studies, it
considers three research questions:
(1) Are there intermediaries and if so, what are their key
functions in getting PES established?
(2) To what extent can local organizations (such as farmers’
associations) act as ES sellers?
(3) What are themain differences in the capacities, power and
relationships of the different intermediaries in negotiating
PES?
METHODS
To investigate the importance and impacts of intermediaries,
we followed five steps. Firstly, we established criteria for
selecting the PES case studies. These were: high poverty
rate, availability of PES projects and their reports from which
lessons could be learnt, willingness of key stakeholders to
be involved in the study, high levels of reduction of natural
resources or ES and access to the project areas. Four sites were
selected: two projects on landscape beauty, one project on car-
bon sequestration andoneproject onwatershedprotection.All
four projects included poverty reduction as one of the object-
ives. Only the carbon sequestration case and one of the land-
scape beauty cases had reached the state of PES implement-
ation and monitoring; the other two were being negotiated.
Secondly, we applied the framework of vanNoordwijk et al.
(2007) to analyse functions of intermediaries at each PES stage
(scoping, stakeholder analysis, negotiation, implementation
and monitoring of agreements). van Noordwijk et al.
(2007) argued that PES is workable if it is realistic (based
on recognizable cause-effects pathways involved in the
production of ES, and with benefits gained by both sellers and
buyers being tangible and sustainable), voluntary (engagement
of ES providers and sellers is based on free choice rather than
obligatory through regulation), conditional (ESprovision only
being rewarded if provided) and pro-poor (equitable impacts
on all actors and PES design is positively biased towards poor
stakeholders). We assumed that the intermediaries were likely
to play a significant role in translating these four criteria into
the PES schemes studied.
Thirdly, we reviewed the project documentation on each
of the four sites to understand how the intermediaries were
involved and their functions. We also reviewed literature on
the role of intermediaries in general and local organizations
(such as farmers’ associations) in particular, in facilitating
the implementation of environmental protection and poverty
reduction adapted to Vietnamese conditions. Following
this, we visited each site twice, where we undertook 39
interviews including nine representative local authorities,
14 representative intermediaries, seven representative ES
sellers and nine representative ES buyers. The selected
interviewees were key actors in the PES schemes investigated
and recognized as experts because of their organizational
roles and experience in PES. The number of interviewees
in each category differed owing to the variable availability of
different stakeholders. These interviews aimed to capture the
stakeholder’s perceptions regarding the role of intermediaries,
the positive and negative impacts of the intermediaries, the
possibility of local organizations acting as ES sellers, and the
relationships amongst different intermediaries.
Fourthly, a questionnaire was sent to all thirty-nine
interviewees to explore their opinions on the possibility of
local organizations being ES providers. The respondents were
also asked to rank the effectiveness of the local organizations in
comparisionwith the other three intermediaries in the fields of
poverty reduction and environmental management. Twenty-
three of the 39 interviewees responded to the questionnaire.
Finally, the initial findings of the above were presented at
a National Workshop in March 2009 in Vietnam, with more
than one hundred participants from international agencies,
international and national non-goverment organizations
(NGOs), local organizations and private companies (World
Agroforestry Center 2009). Open discussions on the findings
between the authors and PES stakeholders in Vietnam
were scheduled throughout the workshop. The draft of this
paper was also reviewed by numerous global PES experts
who attended a ‘Writeshop’ in May 2009 in China with
26 researchers from 11 countries (Providoli 2009). These
workshops acted as a means of triangulating the findings with
those involved in PES in Vietnam and internationally.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Intermediaries and their key functions in getting PES
established
The key groups that acted as intermediaries in the PES
projects investigated were (1) international and local NGOs
and international agencies, (2) government agencies, (3)
local organizations (for example farmers’ associations) and
(4) professional consulting firms. These four groups of
intermediaries have helped the PES cases investigated to be
realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor.
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Realistic
In the scoping stage, the international NGOs, private
consulting firms and government agencies were information
and service providers. They assisted the buyers in searching
for and evaluating the potential and the risks related to
buying particular ES, whilst supporting the sellers by creating
and disseminating information on ES opportunities. With
financial support from the donors, the international NGOs
and professional firms in the PES cases studied (1) invited
overseas experts to train government and local staff (all four
cases), (2) organized study tours (in the landscape beauty
cases), (3) provided technical assistance (all four cases), (4)
conducted inventory surveys (all four cases) and willingness
to pay studies (in the landscape beauty cases), (5) sold their
services for proposalwriting and applications (in the landscape
and biodiversity case) and (6) monitored and evaluated ES
(in the carbon sequestration case). The government agencies
provided information on the possible PES sites as well as legal
advice for ES buyers and international organizations. They
also supported PES through facilitating research, promoting
pilot projects and by working to overcome legal and policy
barriers. All interviewees claimed that this helped PES
stakeholders inVietnam to identify causes and effects involved
in providing ES, and to understand principles for ensuring
tangible and sustainable benefits for both sellers and buyers.
Voluntary
Capacity building for PES implementation and good
understanding of PES requirements are important for PES
provision to be voluntary. In all cases, training and workshops
on different aspects of PES (for example environmental
economics, sustainable financing options and tools for rapid
assessment of ES), were delivered by the international NGOs,
international agencies and government agencies at both the
central and provincial level during different stages of PES.
All interviewees asserted that this created awareness of
PES schemes for all stakeholders and increased the buyers’
willingness to pay and the sellers’ willingness to participate in
PES contracts. They claimed that without a clear assessment
of ES values and status, both buyers and sellers were reluctant
to participate in the PES schemes because they found no basis
and justification for their payments and involvement.
Although the buyers might pay for ES for other reasons,
such as public relations campaigns in the carbon sequestration
case and government regulations in the two landscape beauty
and biodiversity conservation cases, the support of intermedi-
arieswas believed by all interviewees to be critically important,
as this helped them feel that payment was voluntary.
Conditionality and pro-poor
To make PES conditional and pro-poor, the intermediaries
acted as bridge builders, mediators, arbitrators, equalizers,
developers of standards, representatives and watchdogs in all
four PES cases.
PES intermediaries can connect buyers and sellers by build-
ing trust, providing references, making recommendations,
and influencing the partnership formulation and development
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). In all four PES cases
investigated, the government agencies, international NGOs
and professional firms put donors and foreign investors
interested in PES in touch with provincial stakeholders
where there was potential for a PES scheme. They also
bridged the knowledge gap between the policy makers, the
local organizations and the scientists who had different
goals, expectations, jargon and languages. All interviewed
argued that international NGOs and professional consulting
firms were able to present PES in ways which made
it of greater interest to the buyers and the stakeholders
involved. All intermediaries interviewed claimed that before
sending documents to the buyers to call for their interest,
intermediaries needed to tailor the language and presentations
to match with buyers’ interests and investment priorities.
Like any legal and business contract, PES contracts can
require the services of arbitrators and mediators because
of different stakeholder interests (Bakker 2008; Kosoy
et al. 2008). In the cases studied, conflicts were found
amongst stakeholders (for example disagreement on co-
funding principles and project outcomes in the watershed
protection and landscape beauty cases; competition over the
studied area in the watershed protection case), and between
the buyers and the sellers (for example disagreement onbenefit
sharing ratio in the landscape beauty cases; disagreement on
the focus of information on the project published in the
media in the carbon sequestration case). The government
agencies mediated the relationship amongst the stakeholders
by requiring different actors to work at different sites and
organizing regular meetings to bring stakeholders together. In
all cases, the private consulting firms and international NGOs
also collected information on expected benefit-sharing ratios
from both parties and proposed the most reasonable options.
However, all intermediaries claimed that their suggestions
stayed as proposals because the donors/buyers decided
benefit-sharing ratios based on their available fundings and
procedures. All ES sellers claimed that they often agreed with
the benefit-sharing ratios because they did not have a good
understanding of ES and PES. Therefore, they were willing
to accept any offer from the buyers.
Two groups needing support in negotiations about PES
were (1) the sellers (in the landscape beauty cases) and their
representatives (in the carbon sequestration case), in their
negotiationswithESbuyers, and (2) local governments in their
negotiationswith central government and theprivate sector (in
the carbon sequestration case). The international agencies and
NGOs (1) enhanced the voice of these groups by providing
training on negotiation tools (in the landscape beauty and
watershed protection cases), (2) conducted research into
pro-poor policies (in the landscape beauty and watershed
protection cases) and (3) supported provincial authorities in
preparing documents to submit to the central government for
project approval (in the carbon sequestration case).
Developing standards for PES design and for the
responsibilities of key PES stakeholders can guide
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actors to achieve results at reasonable cost and effort
(Wertz-Kanounnikoff & Kongphan-Apirak 2008). In the
cases investigated, PES standards were designed by
both government and non-government intermediaries.
The government established requirements and monitored
performance standards in the carbon sequestration case. In
the watershed protection and landscape beauty cases, the
international NGOs and research organizations developed
different tools and methods (for example rapid hydrology
assessment toolkits), to quantify and evaluate ES rapidly.
Smallholder farmers are poor and are disadvantaged if
a capable and trustworthy intermediary is not present to
advocate on their behalf (Huang & Upadhyaya 2007). All
interviewees claimed that the government agencies were
effective representatives when the ES and the scale of
negotiation related to international buyers (in the carbon
sequestration case), while local organizations (farmers’
associations and women’s unions) were key players in
establishing small PES contracts (landscape beauty cases).
Intermediaries can play a role inmonitoring PES provision,
although to be credible they need to have the trust of
the buyers. Their participation enhances the potential for
the project to be sustainable and accountable (Blagescu &
Young 2006), and keeps the policy ‘honest’ (Pollard &
Court 2005). In all cases studied, international NGOs
monitored watershed protection by different rapid assessment
tools, while a professional consulting firm and government
agencies monitored the carbon sequestration using a standard
verification process.
In all cases, transaction costs were not considered by the ES
sellers, ES providers and the intermediaries, as their primary
goal was to pilot PES inVietnam.Most transactions costs were
covered by the intermediaries themselves because they were
allocated funding from different donors and buyers to cover
such costs. However, all interviewees from the international
NGOs andprofessional consulting firms argued that they tried
to reduce transaction costs by hiring other intermediaries
(for example government agencies) who had rich working
experiences and wide networking in Vietnam, to provide
information and conduct scoping studies.
To what extent can local organizations act as ES
sellers?
Even when potential ES buyers are interested in purchasing
ES, they often find it difficult to choose the appropriate ES
sellers (Koellner et al. 2008). The participation of the poor as
ES providers can be enhanced if there are options for moving
the unavoidable transaction costs of dealing with many small
landholders, such as group certifications and collective actions
(Arifin 2005; Ravnborg et al. 2007). This allows communities,
rather than just individuals, to register as ES sellers, especially
if combined with support for strengthening community-level
organizations, including their legal recognition (Ravnborg
et al. 2007; Leimona & Lee 2008).
There aremany existing examples of farmers’ organizations
that were established by an intermediary to coordinate pro-
duction procedures amongst numerous dispersed smallhold-
ers (Baumann 2000; Arifin 2005; Zhang et al. 2008). All inter-
viewees agreed that local organizations (for example farmers’
associations) in Vietnam potentially have a major role in or-
ganizing ES provision on behalf of poor individual members.
Gathering and forming a group of poor households
is complex. Group formation is facilitated by having a
common interest, culture, ethnic background and economic
status, and having clear incentives. Building on existing
local groups with capacities to reach all sectors of the
rural population is critical in natural resource management
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Arifin 2005; Bonnal
2005). These local groups are often trusted by the local
communities (McIver et al. 2007), interact effectively with
all key stakeholders and have community representatives.
This reduces PES transaction costs significantly (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004; Bracer et al. 2007). In Vietnam,
local organizations have operated for more than 20 years (for
example the Youth Union was established in 1930, women’s
unions were established in 1986 and farmers’ associations
established in 1988). These organizations also have units
working at all levels of the government (central, province,
district and communes, and village) and regularly engage in
activities and meetings with the heads of households. All
interviewees claimed that they wanted these organizations
to act as their representative in working with ES buyers
since the networks and regulations (for example registration,
rules of working, fees, rights and responsibilities) of these
groups functioned well and have long been respected by
communities.All interviewees alsohighlighted that since these
organizations belonged to communist party structure, they
received updated information on government directions and
had close connections with other government agencies, which
made negotiations easier.
Even when groups are formed, a trusted mediator is
essential to harmonize all needs (Baumann 2000; Blagescu
& Young 2006). In Vietnam, local organizations are the
mediators when conflicts occur in local communities. All
interviewees asserted that local households always sought
advice andmediation of local organizations to resolve conflicts.
Local authorities interviewed also emphasized that the issues
must be analysed and mediated by local organizations before
cases could be brought to court. All interviewees agreed
that these local organizations could develop the criteria and
indicators required for equitable and fair payment systems
since they understood ES sellers’ concerns and interests.
All interviewees claimed that local organizations were
favoured by the donors and the buyers to disseminate
information and policies. They can also maintain and provide
trust-based loans for the poor since they have managed
numerous poverty reduction and environmental management
programmes sponsored by international agencies for
community members. Their existing dissemination methods,
financial management and benefit sharing mechanisms were
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useful for PES awareness raising and PES cash flow
management. Also, since these organizations are funded by
government, the transaction costs to run these organizations
can be reduced or can even be shared between the government
and ES sellers. Local interviewees asserted that many staff
at the village level worked voluntarily and were enthusiastic
about reducing management costs.
The extent to which PES is voluntary has been questioned
(van Noordwijk et al. 2007). However, all interviewees
claimed that local organizations successfully encouraged their
members to join group activities voluntarily. The farmers’
associations and women’s unions in all projects investigated
successfully encouraged and cordinated their members to
provide free labour to plant trees to sell and save money to
help poor members. In-depth understanding of local people’s
interests, culture and perceptions, and the experience of these
organizations in communication, suggests that these groups
can facilitate equitable, effective and efficient payments and
voluntarily participation of households.
Despite the potential for local organizations to become
ES providers, major challenges were discussed by the
interviewees.
Firstly, all interviewees claimed that local organizations
had the least power amongst intermediaries because of their
political status. Although they had close relationships with
government and a detailed understanding of government
policies, they were also strongly influenced by government.
Because Vietnam has a ‘command and control’ political
culture, local organizations were established to enhance
political control and cannot be seen in the same way as in
Western civil society (Nørlund et al. 2003; Bonnal 2005).
All interviewees argued that even when local organizations
entered the PES contract as ES sellers, they were still under
the management and direction of local authorities and the
party at the central, provincial, district and commune level.
Secondly, adopting and monitoring PES-related practices
requires substantial technical capacity, knowledge and skills
(Lee & Mahanty 2007). However, all interviewees from
local authorities and organizations attending the consultation
workshop were uncertain whether the local organizations
could understand and implement PES contracts becausemany
staff and leaders working in the associations (particularly at
village level) could not write a report and had only completed
primary school. All local organizations interviewees claimed
that their members were scattered and dispersed, and that
their limited staff numbers and operational budgets would
make ES monitoring difficult. Their limited operational
budget from government also made local organizations
reluctant to be ES providers, as they were uncertain how
they could provide compensation if the contract was not
well-implemented. If local organizations notified contract
violations, they would not have legal rights to punish those
who did not complywith the contract, as this is the role of local
authorities. Furthermore, leaders of these organizations were
elected by community members and local authorities. These
leaders claimed that it would be difficult for them to resolve
contract violations because those who violated contractsmight
be people whom they knew and had good relationships with.
Moreover, all interviewees claimed that the current structure
of local organizations was inequitable. The grassroots village
staff members did most of the work and were closest to the
farmers and the poor, but got the least, or even no, payment.
Although local organizations have potential to become ES
sellers, not all of them are equally powerful and effective.
Forty per cent of respondents claimed that, amongst local
organizations, only the farmers’ associations or women’s uni-
ons were eligible to become ES sellers as they had the largest
number of members, good networks and extensive experience
in both poverty reduction and environmental protection. The
other organizations (youth unions) were seen by seventy per
cent of respondents as either too young or too old (veterans),
and unable to make significant changes to implement PES.
Capacities, power and relationship of different
intermediaries in negotiating PES
Natural resource management can only be effective if the
state, international organizations, business enterprises and
grassroots actors work together (Mapedza & Mandondo
2002). However, our Vietnam case studies showed complex
relationships amongst the four intermediaries, of which we
identified four.
Competitors
Competition was found amongst international NGOs, private
companies and governmental agencies and between interna-
tional NGOs and private companies. This had a disruptive
effect and created other problems that the communities had
to deal with and reduced benefits to people (for example a
slow payment process reduced the commitment of ES sellers
in the carbon sequestration and landscape beauty cases, and
resulted in high transaction costs in the carbon sequestration
case because of a complex administrative system).
Employees and employers
All interviewees claimed that the establishment of PES in
Vietnam was politically and financially driven by the donors.
In all cases, the donors employed international agencies and
NGOs to become intermediaries. International NGOs and
international agencies then hired local organizations and local
NGOs to disseminate PES information in the watershed
protection case, or professional consultants hired government
agencies and staff to collect data for their scoping study in the
carbon sequestration case. One representative intermediary
stated that ‘Some intermediaries had direct control over
others, which affected the dynamics of those with less power
to contribute to PES design and implementation’.
Command and control
All interviewees agreed that, amongst the four intermediaries,
the government was seen as the most powerful actor and had
the strongest influence onPES inVietnambecause of its highly
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centralized institutions. Government influenced how other
intermediaries worked, particularly how local government
and local organizations implemented PES on the ground.
A representative of an international NGO stated, ‘Although
the donors required us to implement specific activities at
the grassroot level, it is critically important for us to ensure
that our activities and project designs are within government
guidelines and instructions’. All intermediaries interviewees
also asserted that private consulting firms were not only
financially driven by the donors and buyers, but were also
strongly influenced by government policies.
Collaboration
All interviewees argued that local organizations enjoyed
working together and that their relationships were supportive
and collaborative. Many local NGOs formed themselves into
networks (Nørlund et al. 2003). All interviewees claimed that
this was useful not only for collaboration and information
exchange, but also for cross checking on the accountability of
the intermediaries.
It should be noted that the political culture in Vietnam was
unfavourable to non-government organizations until around
the mid-1990 s because NGOs were translated as ‘Phi chinh
phu’. This ‘has the connotation of something unorganised and
therefore did not ring positive to Vietnamese who feel most
things should be organised’ (Nørlund et al. 2003). Despite
these traditional perceptions, all interviewees believed that
NGOs have proven themselves to be the most organized and
effective intermediaries in Vietnam.
Although NGOs and international agencies dominated
and the government were the most powerful actor, all
interviewees asserted that other intermediaries still had
influence. Private companies and international agencies had
advantages in negotiating with international buyers (in the
carbon sequestration case, landscape beauty and biodiversity
conservation cases), because of their understanding of the
ES market, while local organizations had the advantage in
negotiating with ES sellers, who were poor farmers (in the
watershed protection case).
General discussion
Critics often argue that intermediaries are expensive and
consume most of the payments in transaction costs (Wunder
2008). However, since PES is still new in Vietnam,
intermediaries have played a critical role in developing PES
proposals, changing attitudes, building trust, networking
with stakeholders, influencing policy priorities, promoting
learning, sharing knowledge and bringing stakeholders
together. It is hard to imagine a PES scheme without
the involvement of intermediaries (Ravnborg et al. 2007).
However, the increasing numbers of buyers and sellers,
and their knowledge of ES markets, are expected to reduce
transaction costs (Landell-Mills & Porras 2002) and may
actually reduce the number of intermediaries required for
successful PES schemes, or at least limit their roles.
Intermediaries are important for facilitating PES, but the
strengths and positive impacts of intermediaries lie in their
international and local identities, relationships, capacity and
adaptation to local situations (Locatelli et al. 2008; Moss
et al. 2009). Intermediaries are expected to be neutral, but
if they have relationships or derive benefits from the buyers
or sellers, their advice is no longer neutral and may not ensure
benefits for buyers or sellers (Mike & Simon 2008). They
can influence and define certain relationships because of their
commercial and political mission. Some intermediaries are
highly selective in the issues they support and the activities
they perform, and may not be able or willing to consider
aspects deemed peripheral to their interests (Moss et al. 2009).
In the PES cases investigated, the local authorities asserted
that the intermediaries, particularly the private consulting
firms, only worked for the benefits of the ES buyers and
did not consult the ES sellers. In this sense, they could be
considered as agents of the buyers rather than intermediaries.
As discussed earlier, international agencies and NGOs are
the dominant intermediaries in Vietnam and are believed to
be more efficient and cost-effective than other stakeholders.
These intermediaries, however, are always under pressure
from the donors to produce measurable outputs within a
short timeframe (van der Meulen et al. 2005; Bendell 2006;
Moss et al. 2009), as well as reflect the preferences of the
donors or investors (Koellner et al. 2008). The securing
of outputs may limit the sustainability of their actions
and accountability (Pollard & Court 2005; Nørlund et al.
2003). They can be powerful actors pushing communities
into certain decisions so that they provide material benefits
and employment (Campbell & Shackleton 2001), change the
nature of a customary or traditional institutions (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004) and harm the poor because of
corruption and disempowerment (Mapedza & Mandondo
2002). Sincemost intermediaries in all four cases studied were
employed by donors, their motivations and accountability
should be carefully examined by PES stakeholders to avoid
negative impact on the poor.
The intermediaries can misunderstand as well as
disempower the poor by conducting weak participatory
work (Bendell 2006; Fraser et al. 2008). All interviewees
claimed that many intermediaries carried out participatory
work to meet project milestones rather than to engage
deeply with communities. Their programmes may overlook
or misunderstand the needs and aspirations of their intended
beneficiaries (Johnson 2001). All intermediaries interviewees,
notwithstanding, claimed that they had to hurry their work to
meet the deadline imposed by donor’s projects, so were less
thorough than they wished.
All interviewees also argued that a ‘top-down’ approach
was prevelant. Consultations at commune level often took
place after decisions had been made at central, provincial
and district levels. The ‘consultations’ were an invitation for
local people to listen to the decision rather than a forum for
expressing opinions and discussion. The interviewees also
claimed that the design of the consultations (for example
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long presentations, powerful government officers juxtaposed
with the poorest of the poor, together with limited time
for discussion), did not provide a comfortable environment
for community representatives to talk. The interviewees
also noted that the large number of intermediaries in PES
establishment and implementation, as well as their complex
relationships, confused local stakeholders, particularly when
many and different messages were given during local
workshops andmeetings. Ideally, suchparticipatory initiatives
need to be carefully designed and have a forum for the voices
of the poor to be heard, including providing input into the
agenda (Fraser et al. 2008).
As discussed earlier, local organizations are potential
representatives of the poor. However, these local groups
need a means to exchange information with government
organizations, donors and ES buyers. All interviewees
claimed that these groups needed training in communication
skills, team work, monitoring, reporting, participatory rural
appraisal tools, negotiation skills and business planning.
Nevertherless, all intermediary interviewees highlighted
the financial constraints in supporting these activities and
biased priorities of donors, which was to build up capacity
for the government agencies only.
All interviewees of local authorities and sellers felt that
a combination of local organizations and local authorities
to represent ES providers would be sustainable. Local
organizations can gather individual households together,
disseminate information and encourage households to
participate, implement the contracts as trainers, information
and service providers, representatives, mediators and
equalizers, and ensure participation is voluntary. Local
government can be the watchdog and arbitrator if there are
contract violations and conflicts. At each level of these local
organizations (central, province, district and commune), there
can be monitoring teams that report regularly to higher levels.
Informal systems always coexistwith formal systems (North
1990). Campbell and Shackleton (2001) highlighted the need
to consider and respect traditional leadership, as well as the
formal structures of government. The same could apply in
Vietnam, as in some areas traditional leaders are regarded as
more important than government. However, many traditional
leaders avoid such adminstrative roles because of insufficient
remuneration to cover the costs of transport and meetings,
and because their families dissuade them, although some feel
that the opportunity to have influence over village decisions is
attractive. The potential role of traditional leaders as PES
intermediaries in Vietnam and elsewhere requires greater
consideration.
Decentralization is often seen as a means to create
transparent and accountable mechanisms for the poor.
However, this does not necessarily improve the performance
and accountability of local government, and indeed may only
empower local elites to capture a larger share of public
resources (Johnson et al. 2003). Given the complexity of
resource management at the community level and the strong
political hierarchy in Vietnam, further research is needed
to explore how community can have an equal voice to
government in PES implementation. The process of defining
and registering competent community-based organizations
that are representative of the different interests of local actors,
and sensitive to the dynamics and power relations in the
community, is an arduous task, usually needing considerable
time (Campbell & Shackleton 2001). Until this is done, PES
in Vietnam is likely to be dominated by the powerful, even if
delivered by the poor.
CONCLUSIONS
Intermediaries, including NGOs, government agencies,
professional consulting firms and local organizations, are
important actors in PES development. The four groups
of intermediaries in the PES cases investigated had
different roles determined by their place within the current
government system and funding. However, concerns have
been raised about (1) commitment to true participation being
compromised by pressure to achieve specific within tight
deadlines affecting the sustainability of intermediary’s actions,
(2) the political influences of donors and government and
(3) their neutrality, since they might have relationships or
derive benefits fromeither the buyers or sellers.Although local
organizations are strongly driven by the government, they are
important channels for the poor to express their opinions and
concerns, because they are trusted and have well-established
systems and effective networks. However, to act as ES
sellers, these local organizations need to overcome numerous
challenges, particularly related to capacity for monitoring
ES and enforcement of contracts. Because intermediaries
operate atmany different levels and have different functions, a
multi-disciplinary and multi-sector approach is required that
includes effective participation and capacity building for the
poorest and least powerful.
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